Discriminations Against Negroes in Primary Elections by Burcham, Joseph R.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 3 
1927 
Discriminations Against Negroes in Primary Elections 
Joseph R. Burcham 
General American Life Insurance Co. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph R. Burcham, Discriminations Against Negroes in Primary Elections, 12 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 199 
(1927). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
To the same effect are the holdings of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in the case of Holland Bank v. Heer Stores Company,3 and the
Supreme Court of Iowa in Leach v. Exchange Bank.34
The vast sums of money that must be kept by the State Treasurer and
deposited in designated banks calls for our depository laws to safe-
guard the State's interest and a strict adherence to the requirements of
our depository laws by our state officials as to the kind and character of
securities to be taken, makes a loss to the state almost impossible.
The law gives to the banks of our state who get the money, funds
with which the industry of the state may receive the benefit and in no
way endangers the right of the general depositor, for when the bank
places the proper character of securities with the state treasurer he
puts back in the bank the cash to take their place.
Whenever the State of Missouri has lost money which was on deposit
in banks that have failed it has not been due to the form or the sub-
stance of our depository laws, but rather to a failure of those in charge
of state funds to insist on the strict observance of the law.
JOHN S. FARRINGTON.*
DISCRIMINATIONS AGAINST NEGROES IN PRIMARY
ELECTIONS
With the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Federal Constitution there arose many and diverse opinions among
the political and social leaders of the nation as to the precise extent to
which the Federal Government could exercise its prerogative in effect-
ing an equality of rights between the newly emancipated Negro race
and the Anglo Saxon race. Any friction or conflicting opinion was,
however, in the course of a few years soon removed, for the United
State Supreme Court in a series of cases resulting from race clashes
promulgated a doctrine now seldom disputed. That court so construed
the Fourteenth Amendment as conferring upon the negroes perfect
equality of civil and political, though not social, rights with whites, and
preventing any person from being made the object of discrimination.'
The Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment as leaving in the sev-
eral states the power to determine the qualifications of voters, the Fed-
eral Government interposing only where a qualified voter is denied the
right to vote because of "race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."
2
It is because of the consistency with which the Supreme Court has
construed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that many of the
early problems resulting from racial contacts are now treated as dormant
issues, having been determined years ago by the courts. Despite the
fact that under the Federal Constitution sufferage cannot be denied to
n 17 Otto 445, 27 L. Ed. 700.
' 281 S. W. 702. "203 N. W. 31.
* Springfield, Mo., Bar. Former Judge, Springfield Court of Appeals.
'See Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 554; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 39.
'See Guinn v. U. S., 238 U. S. 247; Anderson v. Meyer, 238 U. S. 368.
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the negro, the negro has within recent years been made the object of po-
litical discrimination in the State of Texas. Here for many years partly
by party regulations and partly by force of custom, combined with an ele-
ment of intimidation, the negro was denied the right to vote in Demo-
cratic primary elections. The great majority of the negroes are nor-
mally Republican in party matters, and for many years participated free-
ly in the conventions by which the candidates of that party are nomi-
nated. 3 In more recent years however, the control of that party has
passed into the hands of the "Lily White" faction, and the negro has
become a stranger in his own house. Thus cast adrift the blacks
pressed most vigorously for the right to vote in the Democratic pri-
maries, and were admitted to the polls by the party committees in some
few counties of the state. To check the threatened invasion of the
Democratic fold, the Legislature in 1923, passed an act, the pertinent
provision of which reads as follows:
. . . However, in no event shall a negro be eligible to par-
ticipate in a Democratic Party Election held in the State of Texas,
and should a negro vote in a Democratic Primary Election such
ballot should be void, and election officials are herein directed to
throw out such ballot and not count the same.4
By this act the practical elimination of the negro from effective par-
ticipation in politics, which had previously been accomplished by party
action, was written into the law of the land.
To test its constitutionality the aforementioned statute was brought
before the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Nixon v.
Herndon et al.,' Nixon, a negro and Democrat, sued the defendants,
election officials, in a Federal Court for the sum of five thousand dol-
lars, for denying plaintiff the right to vote at the Democratic Primary
Election of - 1924. The defendant justified under the statute, and the
court dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction. From this action
the plaintiff appealed, alleging that the statute contravened the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In declaring the
statute6 void Mr. Justice Holmes, voicing the unanimous opinion of the
Court, held that the law was clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, saying:
The important question is whether the statute can be sustained.
. We find it is unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amend-
ment because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and
obvious infringement of the Fourteenth. That amendment while
it applies to all, was passed as we know with a special intent to pro-
tect the blacks from discrimination against them. . . . 'That
amendment "not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizen-
ship to persons of color, but it denied to any state the power to
The Texas statute provided that the primary is not applicable to a party not
polling at least 100,000 votes at the last preceding general election.
"Article 3093-A; Revised Statutes of Texas-1925.
'Case not as yet officially reported-reprint in U. S. DAILY-March 8th, page
13-column 4. ' Statute quoted in footnote 4, supra.
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withhold from them the equal protection of the laws. . . What
is this but declaring that all persons whether colored or white shall
stand equal before the laws of the states and in regard to the color-
ed race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily de-
signed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law be-
cause of their color."
In answer to the appellees' brief denying that the Democratic primary
election is in any sense a public election, and instead alleging it to be a
private organization of men and women, which they have a right to
regulate independently of governmental interposition, the court said:
If the defendant's conduct was a wrong to the plaintiff the same
reasons that allow a recovery for denying the plaintiff a vote at the
final election allow it for denying a vote at the primary election that
may determine the final result.
The court after stating that the statute discriminated against the negro
on account of color alone, concluded by declaring "that there are limits
to state legislative classification," the court referring here to the police
power vested in the states, and further stating that color cannot be made
the basis for statutory classification affecting the right to vote.
The significance of the instant decision may be easily over-estimated.
At first glance its immediate effect is seemingly to admit the negro to
participation in Democratic party activities. That such a result will fol-
low may well be doubted. It is to be noted that until the enactment of
the statute in 1923 the Democratic Party through its own councils deter-
mined the policies and membership of the organization. As long as the
party determined these matters for itself, there is good reason to believe
that the validity of its acts could not be questioned. Only when the
membership qualifications of the Democratic Party remain the subject
matter of state legislation is the instant decision obligatory. As a conse-
quence of the decision the state of Texas will probably take definite ac-
tion to repeal the statute, place the question of party membership back
in the control of the party councils, and thus unmolested continue to
forbid negro membership in the Democratic Party. It should be noted
that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only forbid a state from
passing any law abridging the privileges and immunities of any citizen
of the United States, or depriving any citizen of the United States of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or denying the right
to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
These amendments neither forbad these wrongs when done by private
individuals or organizations nor authorized Congress to forbid them.
Until some state law has been passed adverse to the rights of citizens
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no Federal Con-
trol can be called into activity. The Fourteenth Amendment is not pro-
hibitive, but instead only corrective of state statutes which impair the
privileges and immunities named in that amendment. This is the whole
of the power vested by the Fourteenth Amendment in the Federal
Government.
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This doctrine the United States Supreme Court enunciated in the
celebrated Civil Rights Cases.7 Here the court was asked to pass upon
the validity of a Federal Statute wherein Congress sought to inflic pun-
ishment upon any individual, who denied negroes the equal and identical
enjoyment with whites of such facilities as public conveyances, theaters,
inns, and the like. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, the court
held that in order to warrant Federal interposition for preservation of
the rights names in the Fourteenth Amendment, the wrong committed
must first be predicated upon some state law for its excuse or perpetra-
tion.
It is true Congress can lawfully punish persons who interfere with the
rights of citizens to vote at elections at which members of Congress are
elected. This it has done.8 This authority however is not derived
from any power vested in Congress by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but instead from Section 4, Article I of the Federal Constitution,
which section reads as follows:
The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the legis-
lature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.
But in the case of Newberry v. United States,9 the Supreme Court
held that a party primary is not an election within the meaning of Sec-
tion 4, Article I of the Constitution. Instead that Court declared that
the regulation of primaries is a matter solely for the states; that Federal
Control would interfere with the purely domestic affairs of the state, and
would infringe upon the police power reserved in the states to suppress
the evils incident to primary elections. In deciding the instant case of
Nixon v. Herndon et al., the court in no way confers upon the Fed-
eral Government the authority to regulate primary elections. Instead,
the court merely holds that a state statute denying negroes the right to
vote in primary elections is void as abridging the right to political equal-
ity afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
As exemplified in the Civil Rights Cases, when a constitutional guar-
antee enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment is abridged by a state
statute, Congress may provide modes of redress against the operation
of such state laws. As the Texas statute regulatory of primary elec-
tions was held violative of the political equality guaranteed in the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress may at its discretion adopt appropriate
legislation for correcting the effects of such a prohibitive state law. It
is to be noted however that when the regulation of primary elections,
including the policies and membership qualifications of the party organi-
zation, is withdrawn from state legislative dominion and replaced in the
hands of the party councils, Federal Control over primary elections is
unwarranted. In the light of this analysis, Senator Borah's conviction
109 U. S. 3.
"U. S. v. Cruikshank et al., 92 U. S. 542. See particularly in this connection
Section 1 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870. (16 Stat. 141.)
9238 U. S. 297.
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that the Nixon case puts primaries under the control of Congress is
seemingly untenable."i
The Supreme Court in declaring in the Nixon case that color could
not be the basis of a statutory classification to vote reiterated a doctrine
enunciated by that court in prior adjudications.
Among instances of unwarranted discriminations by reason of color
alone have been found state regulatory measures forbidding the pur-
chase of property by negroes in zones restricted to whites. In Buch-
anan v. Worley" the court held that a city ordinance preventing the
occupancy of a residence by a colored person in a block restricted to
whites, is unconstitutional, and cannot be sustained on the ground that
it is a valid exercise of the police power in that it promotes peace and
prevents ill-feeling; instead such ordinance infringes upon the inviolate
right to the enjoyment of property; and it makes color a basis for prop-
erty classification, a discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Another instance of statutory discrimination under the guise of police
regulation is depicted in the "grandfather clauses" of several state con-
stitutions. The character and invalidity of such enactments are well
illustrated in the case of Guinn v. United States. 12 An Oklahoma
amendment disbarred from the polls, unless they were able to read and
write, negro citizens who were otherwise qualified to vote, but whose
heirs were not qualified voters on January 1, 1866. Plaintiffs insisted
that the provisions in the amendment fixing voting standards based on
January 1, 1866, were repugnant to the Federal Constitution and the
Fifteenth Amendment. The court in declaring the Oklahoma amend-
ment void admitted, that although the state has the inherent power to
exercise discretion in fixing qualifications of suffrage, nevertheless, the
Fifteenth Amendment denies the state any power to forbid citizens the
right to vote solely by reason of race, color or previous condition of
servitude.
In declaring void statutes prohibiting negroes from sitting as trial
jurors, the Supreme Court has held that when privileges are conferred
upon a class to which negroes are ineligible solely because of race and
color, such negroes are discriminated against within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
13
On the other hand legislatures frequently prescribe color as a basis for
statutory classification and in accord with constitutional guarantees.
The police power confers upon the several states the broad discretionary
prerogative to take all necessary steps to effectively promote public
health, safety, morals and welfare.' 4  Under a reasonable exercise of
this police power the states have been repeatedly conceded without ques-
tion the right to enact "Jim Crow" statutes, assigning passengers to rail-
" Senator Borah, referring to the decision of Nixon v. Herndon et al., de-
clared, "It puts primaries under the control of the Federal government. If we
are disposed to take charge of them we may do so." U. S. DAILY-March 8th,
page 1, column I.
11245 U. S. 60. '2238 U. S. 297.
Strauder v. West Virginia. 100 U. S. 303.
"People v. Wolf, 216 N. Y. S. 241.
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road coaches according to their race,15 providing each race is afforded
equal accommodations without discrimination as to comfort, conveni-
ence, or safety. In Berea College v. Kentucky, 6 the Supreme Court
declared that a Kentucky statute permitting equal education to negroes
and whites in the same private corporation but in different localities is
not an abridgment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, the court emphasizing the fact that the social and economic
rights of the two races may be equal without being identical, and that such
a segregation is conducive to a promotion of harmonious toleration be-
tween the races. Where appropriate public schools are maintained for
colored children, statutes excluding negroes from public schools estab-
lished for whites are valid, provided equal facilities are afforded the
schools of each race.'7
JOSEPH R. BURCHAM, '28.
OPINION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL*
First, can the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, providefor the appointment of a committee or commission to investigate the
State Penitentiary to continue its work and make its report to the Gov-
ernor, President Pro Tern of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
after the adjournment of the General Assembl,? As you very well
know, the General Assembly has the right to investigate any state insti-
tution, and it may, by concurrent resolution, appoint a committee for
that purpose, and may authorize such committee to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, and require the production of books and papers, and
this has been done many times since 1875, the date of the adoption of
the present state constitution. In 1879, in 1881 and in 1883 the Gen-
eral Assembly by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to inquire
into the affairs of the penitentiary, giving the committee authority to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, and require the production of
books and papers. In 1883, the General Assembly, by concurrent reso-
lution, appointed a committee to inquire into the charges against the
State School for the Blind, and it was given the same powers. In 1889,
the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee
to investigate the management of the State University, and it was given
the same powers. In 1897, the General Assembly, by concurrent resolu-
tion, appointed a committee to investigate the Kansas City Police Force,
and it was given the same powers. In 1899, the General Assembly, by
concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to investigate the munic-
ipal and state governments in St. Louis, and it was given the same
powers. In 1911 the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, ap-
pointed a committee to investigate the conduct of the State Game and
Fish Warden, and it was given the same powers. In 1913, the Gen-
eral Assembly, by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to in-
vestigate the State Poultry Board, and it was given the same powers.
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 554. "211 U. S. 45.
People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438.
*An opinion given by North T. Gentry, Attorney General, to the Senate of
Missouri.
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